The Coherence of Empiricism by Casullo, Albert
31
THE COHERENCE
OF EMPIRICISM
by
ALBERT CASULLO
Abstract: Rationalists often argue that empiricism is incoherent and con-
clude, on that basis, that some knowledge is a priori. I contend that such
arguments against empiricism cannot be parlayed into an argument in support
of the a priori since rationalism is open to the same arguments. I go on to
offer an alternative strategy. The leading idea is that, instead of offering a
priori arguments against empiricism, rationalists should marshal empirical
support for their position.
1. Introduction
The debate over a priori knowledge often proceeds in negative terms. For
example, in the first half of the twentieth century, it was common to
maintain that all a priori knowledge is analytic on the grounds that there
is no plausible explanation of how we acquire synthetic a priori know-
ledge. Whatever the merits of this argument against the synthetic a priori,
many now recognize that it cannot be parlayed into an argument in
support of the analytic a priori.1 For we have no better explanation of
how we acquire such knowledge.
In recent years empiricism has come under attack. Some argue that the
view is incoherent and conclude, on that basis, that some knowledge is a
priori.2 We need to recall here the lesson of history. Whatever the merits
of such arguments against empiricism, they cannot be parlayed into an
argument in support of the a priori unless the latter is not open to those
arguments.
My primary contention is that the a priori is open to the arguments
offered against empiricism. Hence, they do not advance the case for the a
priori. I go on to offer an alternative strategy. The leading idea is that,
instead of offering a priori arguments against empiricism, rationalists
should marshal empirical support for their position.
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2. Empiricism Rejected
Laurence BonJour’s excellent book, In Defense of Pure Reason, provides
an interesting case study. His charge against empiricism is that it leads to
skepticism.3 The supporting argument, called the skeptical argument, is
deceptively straightforward. Assume that some beliefs are directly justi-
fied solely by experience. Such beliefs are “particular rather than general
in their content and are confined to situations observable at specific and
fairly narrowly delineated places and times.”4 Either some beliefs whose
content goes beyond direct experience are justified or skepticism is true.
The justification of beliefs whose content goes beyond direct experience
requires inference from the directly justified beliefs. But inference involves
principles that are justified a priori:
For if the conclusions of the inferences genuinely go beyond the content of direct experi-
ence, then it is impossible that those inferences could be entirely justified by appeal to that
same experience.5
Hence, either empiricism is false or skepticism is true.
The skeptical argument, however, proves too much. For the very same
argument can be employed in defense of empiricism! Assume that some
beliefs are directly justified by rational insight. Either some beliefs whose
content goes beyond direct rational insight are justified or skepticism is
true. The justification of beliefs whose content goes beyond direct rational
insight requires principles of inference that are justified empirically:
For if the conclusions of the inferences genuinely go beyond the content of direct rational
insight, then it is impossible that those inferences could be entirely justified by appeal to
that same insight.
Hence, either principles of inference are justified empirically or skepticism
is true.6
No rationalist would take this argument seriously. The obvious reply is
that a belief directly justified by some rational insight R, in conjunction
with a belief in a principle of inference directly justified by some other
rational insight R*, can indirectly justify a belief whose content goes
beyond that of the directly justified beliefs. The same response, however,
is open to empiricists. They can maintain that a belief directly justified by
some experience E, in conjunction with a belief in a principle of inference
directly justified by some other experience E*, can indirectly justify a
belief whose content goes beyond that of the directly justified beliefs.
Hence, for the skeptical argument to succeed, BonJour must show that
experience cannot directly justify principles of inference.
Although he is not explicit on this point, the underlying argument
appears to turn on three claims. The first is a thesis about the nature of
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experience: it is limited to particular objects in close spatio-temporal prox-
imity. The second is an epistemic thesis: no experience can directly justify
a belief whose content goes beyond that of the experience. The third is a
thesis about principles of inference: they are general in character.7 Putting
these claims together yields the following argument, called the generality
argument:
(1) Experience is limited to particular objects.
(2) No experience can directly justify a belief whose content goes
beyond that of the experience.
(3) Principles of inference are general.
(4) Therefore, experience cannot directly justify principles of inference.
We are now faced with two questions. Is rationalism open to the gen-
erality argument? This issue is addressed in Section 3. Can empiricism
avoid skepticism? BonJour’s skeptical argument involves two assump-
tions about epistemic justification: foundationalism and internalism.
Coherentism rejects the dichotomy between directly and indirectly justi-
fied beliefs and maintains that one’s beliefs are justified collectively rather
than individually. Externalism denies that justified belief in a general
principle requires having a reason for thinking that it is likely to be true.
Coherentist empiricism is addressed in Sections 4 and 5. Internalist and
externalist versions of foundationalist empiricism are explored in Section 6.
3. Generality
The question before us is whether rationalism is open to the generality
argument. The second premise of the argument appears to be a con-
sequence of a more general epistemic principle:
(2*) No cognitive state can directly justify a belief whose content
goes beyond that of the state.
The third premise is also general. Indirect a priori justification, as well as
indirect empirical justification, requires general principles of inference.
Hence, if rational insight is limited to particular objects, skepticism is a
consequence of rationalism.
Rationalists, however, claim that there is a fundamental difference
between experience and thought. Although we experience only particular
objects, we apprehend properties of objects. Furthermore, it is our appre-
hension of properties that directly justifies general beliefs.8 Hence,
rationalism can avoid skepticism only if it can sustain the claim that we
apprehend abstract entities such as properties.
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Empiricists find the claim puzzling. One source of perplexity is that
rationalists do not offer a non-metaphorical characterization of this
alleged cognitive capacity. Terms such as ‘apprehend’ and ‘insight’ suggest
an analogy to perception. Perception, however, requires causal contact
with the object perceived and properties cannot stand in causal relations.
Rationalists maintain that the perceptual metaphor is misleading. But, in
the absence of a non-metaphorical characterization, they are not in a
position to state, let alone defend, the claim that we apprehend general
features of objects.
BonJour maintains that the apprehension of properties involved in a
priori justification is the same as that involved in thought in general.
His goal is to explain the apprehension of properties in terms of a more
general theory of how a thought can be about, or have as its content,
some particular property. If the more general theory is to successfully
underwrite the contention that the apprehension of properties does not
involve a quasi-perceptual relation to those properties, it must explain,
without appeal to such relations, how a thought can have as its content
some particular property. BonJour proposes that a thought has as its
content some particular property in virtue of its intrinsic character rather
than in virtue of some relation, quasi-perceptual or otherwise, to that
property. More specifically, he maintains:
In order for the intrinsic character of the thought to specify precisely that particular pro-
perty to the exclusion of anything else, the property in question must itself somehow be
metaphysically involved in that character.9
Clearly, however, a thought about, for example, the property triangular-
ity does not literally instantiate that property since the thought is not
itself triangular. BonJour suggests that such a thought instantiates a com-
plex universal which involves triangularity as a component:
The key claim of such a view would be that it is a necessary, quasi-logical fact that a
thought instantiating a complex universal involving the universal triangularity in the appro-
priate way . . . is about triangular things.10
If, for example, a cognizer’s thought that nothing can be both red and green
all over instantiates a complex universal of which redness and greenness
are constituents, then there is no need to introduce a quasi-perceptual
relation between cognizer and properties to account for the content of
that thought. Consequently, there is no need to introduce such a relation
to account for the cognizer’s apprehension of those properties.
Let us take stock. The generality argument maintains that experience
cannot justify general principles since the content of experience is par-
ticular. Although we experience red objects and green objects, we don’t
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experience the properties of redness and greenness themselves. We experi-
ence only instances of these properties. Experience of instances of propert-
ies, however, is not sufficient to justify general beliefs. Rationalism can
avoid the skeptical consequence of the generality argument only if it can
sustain the claim that we can apprehend not only instances of properties
but also the properties themselves.11 Rationalism can sustain the latter
claim only if it can provide a non-metaphorical account of the apprehen-
sion of properties themselves that does not involve some kind of quasi-
perceptual relation to those properties. BonJour proposes to explain the
apprehension of a property itself in terms of an account of how a thought
can have as its content that property. Although he sets out to offer an
account of how a thought can have as its content some particular pro-
perty, such as triangularity, he does not provide such as account. Instead,
he provides only the bare outline of an account of how a thought can
have as its content particular triangular objects or instances of triangular-
ity.12 Since he does not provide an account of how a thought can have as
its content triangularity itself, he fails to provide any account, let alone a
non-relational account, of the apprehension of properties. Hence, BonJour’s
account reinforces, rather than resolves, the empiricist’s perplexity.
Rationalists are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they can en-
dorse the view that a thought instantiating a complex universal of which
redness and greenness are constituents is sufficient to directly justify the
general belief that nothing is both red and green all over. Since such a
thought is about, or has as its content, particular red and particular green
objects, this endorsement represents a denial of (2*). But if rationalists
concede that the apprehension of particular objects instantiating propert-
ies, rather than the apprehension of the properties themselves, directly
justifies general principles, they cannot maintain, without further argu-
ment, that the experience of particular objects instantiating properties
cannot directly justify general principles. Hence, on the first option, premiss
(2) of the generality argument must be rejected as ad hoc.
On the other hand, rationalists can insist that only the apprehension
of the properties themselves can directly justify general principles. Such
rationalists would deny that a thought instantiating a complex universal of
which redness and greenness are constituents is sufficient to directly jus-
tify a general belief. They would insist that although BonJour has taken
an important first step towards providing an account of the apprehension
of properties, the account is incomplete.13 On this option, rationalists
concede that they have not offered a non-metaphorical account of the
apprehension of properties. In the absence of such an account, rational-
ism cannot underwrite the key claim that the content of thought is not
limited to particular objects and, as a consequence, is open to the gener-
ality argument. Therefore, on either option, rationalism fares no better
than empiricism with respect to the generality argument.
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4. Meta-Reasons
We argued that empiricism is no more vulnerable than rationalism to the
generality argument. This result, however, is not sufficient to establish
that empiricism can offer a plausible account of knowledge of general prin-
ciples. The most prominent theory, due to W. V. O. Quine, rejects founda-
tionalism. BonJour alleges that coherentist empiricism (c-empiricism, for
short) faces two serious objections.14 My goal, in Sections 4 and 5, is to
argue that rationalism faces the same objections.
The first maintains that in order for a person to be justified in believing
that p, the person must be in possession of a reason for thinking that p is
likely to be true. According to c-empiricism, a system of beliefs satisfying
standards such as simplicity, scope, fecundity, explanatory adequacy, and
conservatism is justified. But, asks BonJour,
What reason can be offered for thinking that a system of beliefs which is simpler, more
conservative, explanatorily more adequate, etc., is thereby more likely to be true, that
following such standards is at least somewhat conducive to finding the truth?15
C-empiricists are faced with a dilemma. Either they offer an a priori or
an empirical argument in support of the truth-conduciveness of the stand-
ards. The former is incompatible with empiricism. The latter is question-
begging since it must ultimately appeal to some of the standards it is
attempting to justify.
This objection turns on the claim that being epistemically justified in
believing that p requires having a reason for thinking that p is likely to be
true. The expression “having a reason to think that p is likely to be true”
is ambiguous. Let us distinguish two senses:
(B) S has a basic reason R to believe that p if and only if S has R and
R makes it likely that p is true;
(M) S has a meta-reason R to believe that p if and only if S has R
and S has reason to believe that R makes it likely that p is true.
Let Φ be the set of conditions that, according to c-empiricism, constitute
coherence. Assume that belonging to a system of beliefs satisfying Φ
makes it likely that p is true. If S cognitively grasps the fact that p
belongs to such a system, then S has a basic reason to believe that p.
BonJour’s charge is that c-empiricists cannot offer an argument to show
that such reasons are truth-conducive. Hence, the problem pertains to
having a meta-reason to believe that p.
Does rationalism fare any better on this score? Assume that having an
apparent rational insight that p makes it likely that p is true. Hence, if S
has an apparent rational insight that p, then S has a basic reason to
believe that p. Rationalists are now faced with the question:
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What reason can be offered for thinking that a belief based on apparent rational insight is
thereby more likely to be true?
An a priori argument is circular since it is based on rational insight and
an empirical argument undercuts the a priori status of justification based
on rational insight.16
BonJour recognizes the problem. His response is to argue that a priori
justification does not require a meta-reason. The requirement is question-
begging because rationalism maintains that apparent rational insight is
an excellent reason, in its own right, for accepting a belief:
[It] amounts simply and obviously to a refusal to take rational insight seriously as a basis
for justification: a refusal for which the present objection can offer no further rationale, and
which is thus question-begging.17
Therefore, a priori justified belief that p only requires having a basic
reason for that belief.
C-empiricists, however, can offer a similar response. According to c-
empiricism, p’s belonging to a system satisfying Φ is a basic reason to
believe that p. BonJour does not dispute this claim. Instead, he moves
directly to a demand for a meta-reason. But such a demand presupposes
that belonging to a system of beliefs satisfying Φ is not an excellent
reason, in its own right, for accepting a belief, which begs the question
against c-empiricism.18 Hence, c-empiricism fares no worse than rational-
ism with respect to the demand for meta-reasons.19
5. Revisability
BonJour’s second objection to c-empiricism is that its standards for belief
revision do not impose any constraints on epistemic justification:
After all, any such standard, since it cannot on Quinean grounds be justified or shown to be
epistemically relevant independently of considerations of adjustment to experience, is itself
merely one more strand (or node?) in the web, and thus equally open to revision.20
Hence, whenever those standards appear to dictate that some belief should
be revised, such revision can be avoided by revising the standards them-
selves. The response that such revision is not reasonable or justified can-
not be sustained:
To appeal to the very standards themselves, for example, to the principle of conservatism in
order to defend the reluctance to revise the principle of conservatism, is obviously circular;
while any further standard, even a meta-standard having to do with the revision of first-
level standards, will itself be equally open to revision.21
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Therefore, c-empiricists lack a rationale for not revising the principles of
coherence in the face of recalcitrant experience as opposed to giving up
some other belief in the system.
BonJour’s objection rests on two principles:
(P1) Beliefs justified by experience are revisable; and
(P2) The standards for revising beliefs justified by experience are them-
selves justified by experience.
From these two principles it follows that
(P3) The standards for revising beliefs justified by experience are them-
selves revisable.
But moderate rationalism endorses analogues of these two principles:
(P1*) Beliefs justified by apparent rational insight are revisable; and
(P2*) The standards for revising beliefs justified by apparent rational
insight are themselves justified by apparent rational insight.22
Hence, moderate rationalism is committed to
(P3*) The standards for revising beliefs justified by apparent rational
insight are themselves revisable.
The remainder of BonJour’s argument applies with equal force to moder-
ate rationalism and c-empiricism. Any attempt to block revision of the
standards for belief revision either appeals to the standards themselves,
which is circular, or invokes some further standard, which is itself revis-
able. Hence, once again, rationalism fares no better than empiricism.
An examination of BonJour’s account confirms this conclusion. He
offers two procedures for a priori belief revision: (1) reflection on the
state or process that led to the belief in question; and (2) coherence
among a priori justified beliefs.23 Consider the second. Let Φ = the prin-
ciples that underlie coherence. Assume that S has an a priori justified
belief that p, an a priori justified belief that q, an a priori justified belief
that Φ, and an a priori justified belief that ~Φ(p, q). In the face of such
incoherence, S can retain both the belief that p and the belief that q by
revising the principles that underlie coherence. BonJour blocks this move
by maintaining that
The prima facie justification of the fundamental premises or principles that underlie the
conception of coherence in question must be stronger than that of the other claims whose
justification is being assessed, so that there is a priori justification for thinking that in a case
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of incoherence, it is some among those other claims, rather than the fundamental premises
or principles of coherence themselves, that are mistaken.24
If S’s a priori justification for the belief that Φ is greater than S’s justifica-
tion for either the belief that p or the belief that q, then the expedient of
rejecting Φ is blocked.
Can this strategy be sustained? Consider S’s belief that
(5) My justification for the belief that Φ is greater than my justifica-
tion for either the belief that p or the belief that q.
This belief is itself justified a priori and subject to revision. Hence, S can
preserve both the belief that p and the belief that q by revising (5). The
rationalist will surely respond that such a revision is unjustified or unrea-
sonable. But the response cannot be defended. To claim that S’s justifica-
tion for the belief that (5) is greater than S’s justification for either the
belief that p or the belief that q is circular. It appeals to a belief about the
strength of a priori justification to defend the reluctance to revise a belief
about the strength of a priori justification. If one introduces some further
standard having to do with the revision of justified beliefs about one’s
degree of a priori justification, that standard itself is open to revision.
The only remaining option is to maintain that beliefs about the degree of
one’s a priori justification are so fundamental that they cannot be inde-
pendently justified.
Rationalists can constrain a priori belief revision by claiming that a
priori justification comes in degrees and that beliefs about the degree of
one’s a priori justification are not subject to independent justification.
But, surely, the same strategy is open to c-empiricists. They can also
maintain that not all beliefs within a coherent system are justified to the
same degree and that beliefs about the degree of one’s empirical justifica-
tion are not subject to independent justification. Hence, belief revision is
no more a problem for empiricism than for rationalism.
6. Foundationalism
We have arrived at the conclusion that c-empiricism fares no worse than
rationalism with respect to BonJour’s criticisms. What are the prospects
for a foundationalist version of empiricism (f-empiricism, for short)?
The only argument against f-empiricism is the generality argument. If
f-empiricism cannot offer an account of the justification of general prin-
ciples, as BonJour alleges, then it is committed to a version of skepticism:
the only justified beliefs are those directly justified by experience. The
generality argument, however, involves an important internalist constraint
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on epistemic justification: S is justified in believing that p only if S has
some reason to believe that p is likely to be true. The basic claim of the
generality argument is that experience alone cannot provide a reason
for believing that a general principle is likely to be true. There are two
options for the f-empiricist. The first is to endorse internalism and
address the generality argument. The second is to reject internalism in
favor of externalism.
Internalist f-empiricism is open to the generality argument. But, as we
argued in Section 3, rationalism is also open to the argument. Hence,
rationalists are faced with a dilemma: either accept or reject (2*). If (2*)
is accepted, then internalist foundationalism is not a viable option for
either rationalists or empiricists. Both the rationalist and empiricist vari-
eties of internalist foundationalism lead to skepticism. If (2*) is rejected,
however, internalist foundationalism is a viable option for both rational-
ism and empiricism.
Rationalists who reject (2*) maintain that some apprehensions of par-
ticular objects instantiating properties directly justify general beliefs. A
fully articulated rationalist theory of this sort will include a basic epistemic
principle stating conditions under which such apprehensions directly jus-
tify general principles. This option, however, is also open to empiricists.
They can maintain that some experiences of particular objects instantiat-
ing properties directly justify general principles. A fully articulated em-
piricist theory of this sort will include a basic epistemic principle stating
conditions under which such experiences directly justify general principles.
Rationalists may balk at such a principle. But, unless they can offer some
reason for preferring their epistemic principle over that of the empiricist,
the claim is ad hoc. Although BonJour does not explicitly address the
question of criteria for the acceptability of epistemic principles, he suggests,
in the context of his discussion of c-empiricism, that one such criterion is
truth-conduciveness. But, since he also concedes that rationalists cannot
provide a reason to believe that apparent rational insight is truth-conducive,
they are not in a position to maintain that this criterion provides a basis
for preferring rationalism over empiricism. Hence, internalist f-empiricism
is no more problematic than internalist rationalism.
BonJour briefly considers the possibility that empiricists might reject
internalism in favor of externalism.25 More specifically, the empiricist
might deny the claim that S’s justified belief that p requires having
a reason to believe that p is likely to be true. As we saw in Section 4,
the locution “having a reason for thinking that p is likely to be true”
is ambiguous. Hence, we must distinguish two versions of internalism.
According to basic internalism,
(BI) S’s belief that p is justified only if S has a basic reason to believe
that p.
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According to meta-internalism,
(MI) S’s belief that p is justified only if S has a meta-reason to believe
that p.
Analogously, there are two versions of externalism. Basic externalism denies
that basic reasons are necessary for justification, while meta-externalism
denies that meta-reasons are necessary.
BonJour offers only one argument against externalism:
[W]hatever account externalists may offer for concepts like knowledge or justification,
there is still a plain and undeniable sense in which if externalism is the final story, we have
no reason to think that any of our beliefs are true; and this result obviously amounts by
itself to a very strong and intuitively implausible version of skepticism.26
Although he is not explicit in this context about what is required to avoid
skepticism, he maintains elsewhere that “the fundamental sceptical move
is to challenge the adequacy of our reasons for accepting our beliefs. . . .”27
Clearly, (BI) is not sufficient to meet this challenge. Although (BI) re-
quires that one possess some reason R in order to be justified in believing
that p, it does not require that one have a reason for thinking that R is
truth-conducive. But, to address the charge that R is not an adequate
reason to believe that p, one must offer some reason to believe that R
is truth-conducive. (MI), on the other hand, does address the skeptical
challenge. Since (MI) requires, for being justified in believing that p, both
that one possess some reason R for believing that p and some reason for
believing that R is truth-conducive, one who satisfies these conditions is
in a position to offer some reason for thinking that one’s reasons are
adequate. As we saw in Section 4, however, BonJour acknowledges that
rationalism cannot meet the demand for meta-reasons. Hence, (MI), which
addresses the skeptic’s challenge, is not an option for rationalists and
(BI), which is an option for rationalists, does not address the skeptic’s
challenge. Since the only version of internalism available to rationalism
cannot meet the skeptical challenge, internalist rationalism fares no better
than externalism with respect to skepticism.28 Therefore, we conclude that
neither internalist nor externalist f-empiricism is worse off than rationalism.
7. Rationalism Revisited
The strategy of arguing against empiricism fails to advance the case for
rationalism. Is there a more promising alternative available to rational-
ists? My suggestion is that they exploit two related strategies. Both involve
enlisting empirical support for rationalism rather than offering a priori
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objections to empiricism. The first is to enlist empirical support for the
truth-conduciveness of rational insight. Rationalism enjoys a distinct
advantage with respect to the issue of truth-conduciveness. Empiricism
maintains that experience is the only source of justification. Consequently,
it cannot offer a non-circular justification for the truth-conduciveness of
experience. Since rationalism recognizes two distinct sources of justifica-
tion, it can offer a non-circular justification for the truth-conduciveness
of one of them. Moreover, in the context of its dispute with empiricism,
the truth-conduciveness of experience is not in question. Hence, rational-
ism can exploit this point of agreement to offer a justification of the
truth-conduciveness of rational insight that meets empiricist standards.
The second is to offer an explanation of the truth-conduciveness of
rational insight. Rationalists generally agree that the truth-conduciveness
of rational insight cannot be explained in terms of causal-perceptual
models. Hence, if rationalism is to provide some explanation of our
alleged capacity for a priori justification, it must offer an alternative
model of how such justification is possible. Furthermore, if the model is
to be regarded as a plausible explanation of our capacity for a priori
justification, rationalism must offer empirical evidence showing that the
model is realized in human cognition. I conclude by outlining two projects
based on these strategies which, if successfully completed, would advance
the case for rationalism.29
In order to enlist empirical support for the truth-conduciveness of the
alleged source of a priori justification, rationalism must be more fully
articulated. In particular, rationalists must provide a generally accepted
description of the cognitive state that directly justifies beliefs a priori, the
type of beliefs it justifies, and the conditions under which it justifies the
beliefs in question. Opponents of rationalism often claim that they find
cognitive states such as rational insight puzzling or even mysterious.
Rationalists typically bridle at the claim and respond with remarks
such as “What could be more familiar?” followed by a phenomenological
description of the state. Yet, if one surveys these descriptions, one finds
enormous variation:
1. a direct insight into the nature of properties;
2. the unthinkability of the falsehood of the proposition;30
3. finding yourself utterly convinced that the proposition is not only
true but could not have been false;31
4. it intellectually seems to you that the proposition is true;32
5. an inclination to believe the proposition that is rooted in
understanding.33
Rationalists are faced with a dilemma. Either we have direct introspective
access to the cognitive states that provide direct a priori justification or
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we do not. If we do, sympathetic and sophisticated proponents of the
position should be able to arrive at some consensus over the correct
description of those states. If we do not, then some alternative rationale
must be offered to support the claim that there are such states. The lack
of consensus among rationalists lends support to the claim that some-
thing more needs to be said here.
There is also wide variation among rationalists over the scope of be-
liefs justified a priori. These differences often do not manifest themselves
within epistemological contexts since the focus is on stock examples such
as elementary logical or mathematical propositions, simple analytic truths,
and a few familiar cases of alleged synthetic a priori truths. An exclusive
focus on these cases, however, does not allow the rationalist to address
the question of whether the cognitive states that are alleged to justify
these beliefs are truth-conducive. To address this question, two factors
are essential. First, the full range of beliefs alleged to be justified by the
state must be provided, including the controversial and discredited cases.
Second, the different types of beliefs, including metaphysical, methodo-
logical, logical, mathematical, modal, scientific, and moral, must be taken
into account. For one key question is whether truth-conduciveness varies
across these different categories. In the absence of a more complete articula-
tion of the scope of the a priori, the crucial issue of truth-conduciveness
will remain a subject of speculation, supported or rejected by bits of
anecdotal evidence.
Finally, the conditions under which beliefs are justified a priori must
be addressed. There are two distinct sets of issues here. The first is a
specification of the conditions under which beliefs are prima facie justi-
fied by rational insight (or whatever other cognitive state is proposed as
the source of a priori justification). BonJour maintains that there are cer-
tain background conditions that must be satisfied in order for an appar-
ent rational insight to have its justificatory force: the proposition must be
considered with reasonable care, the person must have an approximate
grasp of the concept of necessity, and one’s reason must not be clouded
by dogmatism or bias.34 Two questions emerge. Is the list complete? Do
the conditions introduce concepts that require further articulation? For
example, one condition is that the cognizer have an adequate grasp of the
concept of necessity. But in the absence of a non-metaphorical charac-
terization of the relation in question and some means of determining
when a grasp of a concept is adequate, one cannot determine whether the
condition is satisfied. The second is a specification of the conditions under
which prima facie a priori justification is defeasible. Defeaters fall into
two broad categories: overriding defeaters and undermining defeaters.35
There are two primary questions in the case of overriding defeaters. First,
under what conditions, if any, do conflicts of rational insight undermine
justification based on such insight? Second, can there be empirically justified
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overriding defeaters for beliefs justified a priori? Parallel questions arise
in the case of undermining defeaters. Does a track record of conflicting
beliefs or errors based on rational insight undermine justification based
on such insight? Can a priori justified beliefs be defeated by empirically
justified beliefs regarding the neuro-physical processes that underlie
rational insight?
The second project is to show that the cognitive states identified at the
phenomenological level are associated with a single type of process or a
unified group of processes that play a role in producing or sustaining the
beliefs they allegedly justify and in explaining how they justify the beliefs
in question. This project serves three purposes. The first is to show the
bearing of the philosophical theory to human knowledge. If the cognitive
processes involved in the theory play no role in producing or sustaining
the beliefs that they are alleged to justify, then the theory provides no
explanation of the justification of our actual beliefs. Moreover, if those
processes cannot produce or sustain the beliefs in question, then the theory
does not even explain how we can justify our beliefs. The other purposes
are more theoretical. The distinctive claim of a rationalist epistemology
is that there are two basic types of justification: experiential and non-
experiential. Initially, this difference is marked at the phenomenological
level. If the cognitive processes associated with these phenomenological
markers manifest no significant differences in their features or the man-
ner in which they produce beliefs, then there will be legitimate questions
about the significance of the experiential/non-experiential distinction. If
they do, then these differences may deepen our understanding of this
distinction. Finally, there is the prospect of understanding how the states
in question justify the beliefs they produce. In particular, a better under-
standing of the underlying processes may help us understand how the
cognitive states identified at the phenomenological level produce true
beliefs about the subject matter in question. This understanding, in turn,
is the key to providing a non-causal-perceptual account of rational insight
and explaining why such insight is truth-conducive.
8. Residual Problems
Two residual problems remain. I have argued that rationalists should
offer empirical support for the truth-conduciveness of rational insight.
As we saw in Section 6, BonJour maintains that such a strategy under-
mines the a priori status of beliefs justified by rational insight. This claim,
however, rests on an incorrect view of the epistemic function of such
empirical support. Consider his response to the challenge that rationalists
offer some reason for believing that rational insight is truth-conducive:
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The implicit suggestion is that one who accepts a claim on the basis of such insight must
be appealing, at least tacitly, to a premise of this sort as an essential part of the alleged
justifying reason in order for a justification that is genuinely epistemic in character to even
putatively result.36
Hence, he concludes that offering empirical support for the truth-
conduciveness of apparent rational insight undercuts its a priori status.
It is important, however, to distinguish two different rationales for
such a demand. The first is the demand of a meta-internalist who main-
tains that having a meta-reason for believing that p is a necessary condi-
tion for being justified in believing that p. The second is the demand of
an empiricist for a reason to accept the rationalist’s epistemic theory or,
more specifically, the rationalist’s account of a priori justification. Here
the critic is not maintaining that in order for S to be a priori justified in
believing that p, S must have some reason to believe that rational insight
is truth-conducive. Instead, the critic is arguing that, since epistemic jus-
tification requires an essential connection with truth, reasonable accept-
ance of the rationalist’s central contention – that rational insight is a
source of epistemic justification – requires reasonable belief that rational
insight is truth-conducive. The first strategy proposed in Section 7 pro-
vides rationalism with a response to such an empiricist critic.
One might still maintain that the strategy is hopelessly circular. For
BonJour has argued that experience cannot justify general principles.
Since the claim that rational insight is truth-conducive is general, the
rationalist must admit that, if it is justified, its justification involves an a
priori element. Two points are relevant here. First, my primary negative
thesis is that it is a mistake in strategy to support rationalism by arguing
that empiricism leads to skepticism. For, as was shown in Section 3,
rationalism is also open to the argument. Therefore, the rationalist should
give up the skeptical argument. Second, we must distinguish two distinct
epistemic issues. The first is defending the claim that general principles
are known (or justifiably believed) against skeptical challenges. What is at
issue here is the existence of knowledge of (or justification for believing)
such principles. The second is defending the claim that general principles
are known (or justifiably believed) a priori against empiricist challenges.
Empiricists are not skeptics. They maintain that many general principles,
including logical and mathematical principles, are justified. Their dis-
agreement with rationalists is not over the existence of knowledge of (or
justification for believing) general principles but over the source of that
knowledge (or justification). Hence, rationalists can successfully resolve
their dispute with empiricists by offering empirical support for the gen-
eral claim that rational insight is truth-conducive. If their supporting case
involves only general principles that empiricists regard as justified and
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the evidence meets the standards that empiricists regard as adequate
for justification, then reasonable empiricists must concede that there are
cogent grounds for endorsing rationalism.
9. Conclusion
Rationalists have not fully exploited the available resources for advan-
cing their case. They have focused their efforts on offering a priori argu-
ments against empiricism. I argue that this strategy ultimately fails since
rationalism is also open to those arguments. On the positive side, I suggest
that a more fruitful approach for rationalists is to offer a fuller articulation
of their position and to utilize the articulation to offer empirical evidence
that supports the central claim that rational insight is truth-conducive
and provides some explanation of this fact.37
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